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Are language skills important in explaining the nexus between house prices and immigrant 
inflows? The language barrier hypothesis says immigrants from a non common language 
country value amenities more than immigrants from common language countries. In turn, 
immigrants from non common language countries are less price sensitive to house price 
changes than immigrants from a common language country. Tests of the language barrier 
hypothesis with Swiss house prices show that an immigration inflow from a non common 
language country equal to 1% of an area's population is coincident with an increase in prices 
for single-family homes of about 4.9%. Immigrant inflow from a common language country 
instead has no statistically significant impact. 
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Recent evidence from country studies on house prices shows that the impact
of immigration on local house prices is a global phenomenon. Saiz (2007)
estimates that an immigrant in
ow equal to 1% of a city's population results
in a 2% increase in house prices for U.S. cities. Gonzalez and Ortega (2009)
show that the price eect through immigration is higher for the Spanish
housing market. Akbari and Aydede (2009) also nd immigration eects for
the Canadian housing market, however their long-run estimates are muted
compared to the short-run estimates for the United States and Spain.
One interpretation for the positive spatial correlations - the correlation
between house prices and immigration across local markets - is the impor-
tance of local immigrant-specic amenities and networks. Saiz (2007) argues
that immigrants are less sensitive to housing costs, because local immigrant-
specic amenities and networks are more important to them. Until now,
previous studies treat immigrant preferences for local amenities to be ho-
mogenous. In other words, British immigrants to the United States have the
same demand for local amenities as do Mexican immigrants. This assumption
is relaxed in this paper. It is argued that language barriers are an important
determinant for the demand for local immigrant-specic amenities. The key
1assumption is that non common language immigrants have a higher demand
for immigrant-specic amenities than do common language immigrants.
The paper's objective is to show empirically that the strength of the
spatial correlations between house prices and immigration is explained by
the immigrant's home language. The language barrier hypothesis is that non
common language immigrants are less price sensitive than common language
immigrants. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that common language
immigrants are less reliant on local immigrant-specic amenities compared
to non common language immigrants. As a consequence, common language
immigrants integrate quickly and behave similarly to natives. This means
that the observed positive correlation between immigration 
ows and house
prices in Saiz (2007) and Gonzalez and Ortega (2009) should be explained
primarily by non common language immigrants.
The empirical analysis examines the behavior of Swiss house prices to
European immigration 
ows for 85 districts between 2001 and 2006. Switzer-
land's three main languages (French, German, and Italian), which are com-
mon to several European countries, serves as a valid test case for the language
hypothesis. Conditioning on a set of local variables, the results show that
an immigration in
ow from a non common language country equal to 1% of
2an area's population is coincident with an increase in prices for single-family
homes of about 4.9%. Immigrant in
ow from a common language country
instead has no impact.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the links between
language and local amenities. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology.
Section 4 discusses the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 documents
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The role of language barriers
There is a large empirical literature that shows language barriers in
uence
economic exchange in international trade and nance.1 These diversity mod-
els emphasize the importance of communication and identify common lan-
guage with elements of trust and cultural distance as determinants that fa-
cilitate economic transactions. Using a wide array of indictors, the diversity
literature shows that the volume of cross-border transactions increases once
communication frictions are reduced.
Language barriers are also an important factor in
uencing an immigrant's
settlement choice where to reside in his newly adopted country.2 For immi-
1See Guiso et al. (2009) and the many references therein.
2There are many related elds of discrimination that examines the linkages between
3grants that do not share a common language with natives, communication is
a barrier. As such, the local supply of simple services that are language ori-
ented (i.e., foreign schools for kids, medical and nancial services, haircuts,
etc.) should weigh heavily in the non common language immigrant's deci-
sion for choosing a new home. Instead for common language immigrants, the
demand for the same services and amenities is lower. They are able to use
services that are oriented towards the native population. Hence, for the com-
mon language immigrants the demand for language-oriented services should
not be location specic.
Similarly, common language narrows the cultural gap between natives and
immigrants. In the case of Switzerland, its neighboring countries speak the
same language and share many cultural characteristics. As a consequence, it
is easier for common language immigrants to integrate themselves in social
networks shared by natives. Instead for non common language immigrants,
the cultural gap between them and natives is larger. This means the range
of possible social networks available to them is more restrictive.
language prociency and earnings, see for example Rivera-Batiz (1990) and Chiswick and
Miller (1995). A related literature is ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immi-
grants, see Edin et al. (2003). However, each does not consider the link between immigrant
language barriers and house prices.
4A key assumption in the model by Saiz (2007) is that immigrants are less
sensitive to changes in house prices than natives, because local immigrant-
specic amenities and networks are more important for them. If this is the
case, immigration in
ows could spur net out
ows of natives because of the
increased housing costs that are associated with a housing demand shock.
There is no way to separate the eect of increased housing demand (immi-
gration) from the potential demand (native out
ows). Saiz (2007) notes a
positive eect of immigration on house prices, if natives are not innitely
sensitive to changes in housing costs and if they are not displaced one for
one in the labor market.
The setup follows the model of Saiz (2007). The only dierence is that
I assume common language immigrants behave as natives and focus on the
impact of a smaller subgroup of immigrants dened as non common language
immigrants. This means that the immigrant eect arising from the demand
for local-specic amenities was underestimated in previous studies by Saiz
(2007) and Gonzalez and Ortega (2009).
3. Econometric specication
I estimate the impact of immigrant in
ows on house prices at the district
5level. The empirical baseline specication follows Saiz (2007)






2Xi + "it; (1)
where pit = ln(pit=pit 1) denotes the annual change in house prices in dis-





ow relative to the population at t   1 for district i. The analysis
considers three variants of equation 1. Each uses a dierent measure of im-
migration, Ik, where k = fa = all, ncl = non common language, and cl =
common languageg. Changes in unemployed divided by population is de-
noted by uit 1. Further, t is a year xed eect and Xi is a set of control
variables, capturing region-specic characteristics. The shock to house prices
in region i at time t is "it.
The specication in rst dierences assumes that regional xed eects are
ltered out. Still, I am interested in regional indicators that capture common
information across local regions.3 These ve indicators are an index for
district size (8 dierent categories), an index for district typology (14 dierent
categories from agglomeration to rural), an index for district language (4
3The issue whether the contemporaneous deterioration of public services through in-
creased population is adequately re
ected in the regional indicators or house prices is an
open issue. At best this means that the immigration impact eect is underestimated.
6categories), a dummy for economic strength (+1 if receives scal transfers,
0 otherwise), and an index for social economic status (index from 0 to 100
based on education, job possibilities, income).
The coecient of interest, k, is interpreted as the percentage change
of house prices associated with annual in
ows of immigrants equal to 1%
of a district's population. Because of the annual frequency of the sample,
k is interpreted as a short-run estimate in which the supply of housing
does not respond immediately to immigration.4 In other words, an increase
in immigration into a district raises its local population and thereby the
demand for housing. The increase in local demand raises prices and results in
a positive k with the language hypothesis assuming that ncl > a > cl > 0.
This positive eect of immigration on house prices dened by the language
hypothesis also assumes that natives are not innitely sensitive to changes
in housing costs and that native displacement from the local housing market
4Gonzalez and Ortega (2009) and Saiz (2007) also work with annual data and interpret
 as a short-run estimate capturing demand eects. Instead, the literature that relies on
census data such as Greulich et al. (2004) and Ottaviano and Peri (2007) for the United
States interpret the results at the decennial frequency as long-run estimates. The latter
interpretation assumes that housing supply varies in response to immigration, while the
former interpretation does not.
7is not complete.
An empirical shortcoming of the baseline equation (1) is that it does not
include a measure of household income for the full sample estimates. This
limitation is due to data availability.5 The absence of Swiss income means
that the estimates for k in equation (1) are subject to an omitted variables
bias. In other words, OLS estimates overstate potentially the immigration
eect. For a restricted sample with household income at the district level, I
show that the omitted variables bias linked to income does not in
uence the
empirical results.
Potential measurement problems for the measure of immigrant 
ows raise
concerns of the attenuation bias for the estimate of k, see Aydemir and Bor-
jas (2011). Immigration 
ow is measured as the annual change in the number
of foreign nationals residing in Switzerland. Because the immigration stock
varies in response to naturalized citizens and births of foreign nationals, my
measure of immigration 
ow is contaminated. This measurement problem
drives the OLS estimate of k towards zero. Although at the national level
5Income data at the city level is available only for the cantons of Basel-City, Zurich,
and Thurgau for the year 2000. It is therefore not possible to construct a measure for
income changes at the district level for the full sample.
8the dierence between foreign nationals and foreign born population is small
by international comparisons, it is dicult to determine how large the mea-
surement problem is across regions.6
Establishing causality through an exogenous source of 
uctuations in im-
migration in
ows represents an additional concern for OLS estimation of k
in equation (1). Immigration to a local area is likely to be an endogenous
event. For example when controlling for local factors, immigrants may pre-
fer areas where housing costs are increasing more slowly. This sensitivity to
rising housing costs biases the OLS estimate of k towards zero.




POPit 1), an instrumental variables (IV) strategy is used that is based
on the settlement patterns of immigrants in previous periods.7 This instru-
6Swiss record keeping of immigrants follows the \ius sanguinis" concept. In 2006,
foreign nationals were 20.2% of the population, while foreign born were 22.9% of the
population. See table 3 in M unz (2008) for European comparisons.
7As noted in Saiz (2007), the IV approach assumes that immigrants do not have in-
formation in picking winners, i.e., cities with high future growth rates. In the setup it
is even more so unclear why language barriers improves the ability of non common lan-
guage immigrants to pick growth areas over the common language immigrants. Further,
the winner's story is less of an issue for a small country like Switzerland. The regional
growth dierences are not as large as in a big country such as the United States or Spain.
9ment strategy has been used previously by Saiz (2007), Gonzalez and Ortega
(2009), and Ottaviano and Peri (2007). The instrument is constructed such
that it is independent from local contemporary demand factors, which pos-
sibly aect the settlement choices of immigrants. The instrument, referred


















The share of immigrants from country c settling in district i in 1997 is de-
noted by 
k;1997
ci .8 The instrument is constructed with 11 countries of origin:
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and other.9 The common language group is
Further, Switzerland is unique in that it has a good transportation system used by many
commuters. Hence, unemployment or income tax statements at the district level are not
necessarily a re
ection of the district's growth prospects.
8Munshi (2003) shows that settlement patterns of previous immigrants determine lo-
cation choices of arriving immigrants from the same country of origin.
9Immigration in Switzerland is a European phenomena. Unlike other European coun-
tries, such as the United Kingdom or Spain that received many immigrants from other
continents, 95% of Switzerland's immigrants are from Europe. Further in the setup, I do
not treat the Swiss linguistic areas as separate countries. For example, for the non com-
mon language immigrants there should be no clear preference for linguistic region, while
for common language immigrants this should be the case.
10Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. The remaining seven countries make








ct over origin countries, I hope to obtain a predicted
measure of total immigrant in
ows in district i at time t that is orthogonal
to local demand conditions. Finally, the instrument is normalized by the
population in district i at t   1.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
This section is divided into two subsections. The rst presents the house
price data along with descriptive statistics. The second subsection discusses
special features of the Swiss housing market.
4.1 Data
The annual sample is from 2001 to 2006. The hedonic adjusted prices are
for single-family homes, multi-family homes, and condominiums, spanning
85 districts that have a residential population of at least 25,000 inhabitants
in 2001.10 Similar data for rents are unavailable at the district level.11 The
10The term \district" refers to the 106 MS-Regionen, see W uest and Partner (2004a)
for further denitions.
11Because multi-family homes are rental units sold primarily for investment purposes,
11average annual increase in house prices from 2001 to 2006 is 1.52% for single-
family homes, 2.06% for multi-family homes, and 1.43% for condominiums
(weighted by population over the 85 districts).12 The examined areas encom-
pass 96.38% of the Swiss residential population. Data on house prices are
from Informations- und Ausbildungszentrum f ur Immobilien.
Data on the number of foreigners grouped by their country of origin are
available at the city level. Between 2001 and 2006, Switzerland had a positive
net migration rate of 2.9 per 1,000 inhabitants, consistent with the European
average of 3.0 per 1,000 inhabitants, see M unz (2008). For the sample of 85
districts, the gure rises to 3.3. The immigration data are from the Federal
Oce for Migration. Further, data on the number of unemployed for each city
are from the State Secretariat for Economic Aairs. Last, data on the total
this index best captures pressures in the rental market. Although there is no available
data, it is believed that immigrants are primarily renters. Thus, it is expected that this
index responds the strongest to non common language immigrants.
12The respective unweighted gures are 1.20% for single-family homes, 2.08% for multi-
family homes, and 0.99% for condominiums, suggesting that home prices for larger districts
grew slightly faster. The fact that new construction investment as a percentage of GDP
stagnated at 6% throughout the sample is a further re
ection of the moderate price growth
for Swiss homes. Weak persistence is a further implication of the moderate house price
in
ation.
12resident population and on the ve socio-economic and regional indicators
for each city are from the Federal Statistics Oce. Information at the city
level is aggregated to match the housing data at the district level.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the two main variables in equation
1: immigrant-to-population ratio, (Ik=POPt 1) and house prices, (P)
for the period 2001 to 2006. The (unweighted) mean in
ow of non common
language immigrants for the 85 districts was slightly larger than for the
common language immigrants. The same result also holds for the variance.
The second group of variables are log annual changes in house prices. Average
annual price changes in multi-family homes showed the largest gains followed
by single-family homes and then condominiums. The same ordering is also
observed for the variance.
4.2 Specic features of the Swiss housing market
To show that the results are primarily explained by demand shocks in tight
local markets, the main distinguishing features of the Swiss housing market
are brie
y discussed. House price in
ation in Switzerland is low by inter-
national standards. Table 2 lists the average annual real increase in house
prices for 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006. The historical record shows
that the average real price increase for Swiss housing is 0.34%. This gure
13is the second lowest among the advanced countries and is seven times lower
than the returns for U.S. homes examined in Saiz (2007).13
Low demand for owner occupancy and nationwide rent control are fre-
quently mentioned as factors explaining the muted growth in Swiss house
prices, see Werczberger (1997). The rates for home ownership in Canada
(65.8%, national census 2001), New Zealand (67.8%, 2001), Spain (85.3%,
2000), and the United States (67.8%, 2000), countries examined in previ-
ous house price-immigration studies, are twice that of Switzerland's (35.5%,
2000). Unlike in many other countries, the Swiss federal government does
not actively promote home ownership.14
Nationwide rent control is a further reason for low house price in
ation
in Switzerland. Rent increases must be justied by the landlord's cost in-
creases, see Stalder (2003). As such, rent increases do not fully re
ect mar-
ket pressures. Figure 1 shows the levels of the W uest and Partner index for
13W uest and Partner (2004b) calculate international investment returns for housing,
yielding similar results as in Table 1.
14In fact, taxes discourage owner-occupancy in Switzerland. Property is treated as an
asset subject to wealth and income taxes for imputed rental income. Further, unlike other
nancial investments in Switzerland, housing is subject to capital gains taxes. Capital
gains are taxed at the cantonal level with rates diering by duration of ownership.
14rents and single-family homes from 2000:1 to 2006:4. The quarterly index
for rents moves in a trend like manner, re
ecting legislative constraints for
rent increases. Instead, home prices show greater 
uctuations with moderate
growth.15
A tight housing market is often the consequence of pro-tenant laws. A
tight housing market is characterized by in low vacancy and low turnover
rates. For the period of investigation, the average vacancy rate, measured
by the Bundesamt f ur Statistik, is 1.34% for Swiss rental units compared
to 9.7% for U.S. rental units. The tightness of the Swiss housing market
is also re
ected in low occupancy turnover rates. W uest and Partner esti-
mate the average stay to be 5 to 6 years for rental units, 12 to 14 years for
condominiums, and 20 years for single family homes.16
In the empirical analysis of section 5, only local information from vacancy
rates enters the micro specication. Information on turnover and on home
ownership rates is unavailable at the annual frequency. Similarly, the mar-
ket impact from nationwide rent control is only indirectly captured as an
explanation for moderate price movements in Swiss house prices.
15A corresponding rent index at the regional level is unavailable for Switzerland.
16These turnover rates are indicative for select districts based on information from W uest
and Partner (2004a).
155. Estimation results
The empirical results in this section show that immigrant 
ows from a non
common language country are coincident with Swiss house prices, but immi-
grant 
ows from a common language country are not. I rst present baseline
estimates using price indexes of three dierent home types. Thereafter, ro-
bustness checks are conducted on the coecient estimates for immigration

ows from common and non common language countries. The last set of
results are for individual European countries.
Table 3 presents IV regressions for single-family homes, multi-family
homes, and condominiums. All regressions are estimated with time eects
and with ve regional controls. The coecients of these controls are not re-
ported in the tables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
Table 3 Panel B shows the rst-stage regressions between the endoge-
nous variable (
Iit
POPit 1) and the instrument, SPit (the other variables are not
shown). The coecient estimate for the instruments in the specication for
all immigrants is 0.856, immigrants from non common language countries
is 0.929, and immigrants from common language countries is 0.836. Each
of these instruments are signicant at the 1% level. As a further check of
16the instruments, the F-test for weak instruments is used. The F-tests for
the joint signicance of the excluded instruments range between 18.05 and
31.98, suggesting that the instruments do not suer from the criticism of
weak instruments.
Next, Table 3 Panel A shows the second-stage estimates of the baseline
specication. The signicance of the variable of interest, (
Iit
POPit 1), is sample
dependent, whereas the control variable, uit 1, is found to be almost always
insignicant. Immigration 
ows from non common language Europe is found
to be signicant at the 1% level. The coecient estimates range from 2.3
for condominiums (see column 8), 4.9 for single family houses (see column
2), to 5.4 for multi-family homes. I interpret the results as saying that an
immigration in
ow from a non common language country equal to 1% of an
area's population is coincident with an increase in prices for single-family
homes of about 4.9%.
The results for common language countries are found in columns 3, 6, and
9. These results show that immigration in
ow from the neighboring countries
(i.e., Austria, France, Germany, and Italy) are insignicant. Further, the
coecients for (
Iit
POPit 1) are not consistently signed. The coecient estimate
is 1.2 for single family homes, but -1.7 for multi-family homes and -0.7 for
17condominiums.
The coecient estimates for all immigrant in
ows are presented in columns
1, 4, and 7. The results for the eleven European country groups are highly
signicant, but as expected their coecients lie between those of common
and non common language immigrants. The estimate of 2.7 for single-family
homes (see column 1) is comparable to the estimates that Saiz (2007) nds
for the United States.17
The results in Table 3 are interpreted as follows: The nexus between
immigration 
ows and house prices is dependent on a particular group of
immigrant 
ows from non common language countries. To explain this re-
sult, it is assumed that common language immigrants demand less amenities
and are therefore more price sensitive than non common immigrants. The
observation that the common language immigrants are neighboring countries
reinforces the conjecture of cultural anity with the Swiss.
Table 4 presents three robustness tests for single-family homes with re-
gional controls. The robustness tests consider the importance of income for
a smaller sample, the in
uence of large cities, and the introduction of a va-
17Further, empirical results for the case of all immigrant in
ows are in Degen and Fischer
(2007).
18cancy ratio. The robustness checks show that the baseline estimates in Table
3 for single-family homes is not sensitive to alternative specications.
The rst check considers the role of income for a restricted sample due to
data availability. In columns 1, 2, and 3, I add changes in taxable household
income (per capita) for the 85 districts for 2002 to 2006. The results show
that income enters signicantly for all three groups of immigrant 
ows, how-
ever the coecients always less than 0.05. In this restricted sample the all
immigrant eect for (
Iit
POPit 1) rises to 3.2 compared to the baseline estimate
of 2.7 in Table 3. For the other two immigrant 
ow measures (NCL and CL)
the coecient estimates are similar to the baseline.18 They again show that
only non common language in
ows matter.
A further robustness check considers whether the 11 largest districts with
a population greater than 150,000 in
uence the estimates.19 Columns 4, 5,
and 6 show that the coecient estimates for (
Iit
POPit 1) falls in the restricted
18To determine whether income or the smaller sample that excludes 124 observations is
responsible for the stronger price eect, a specication without income for the restricted
sample was also estimated (not shown in Table 4). However, tests showed that the estimate
for immigration 
ows is not in
uenced by changes in household income.
19The 11 districts are Aarau, Basel-City, Basel-Lower Area, Bern, Geneva, Glattal-
Furttal, Lausanne, Luzern, St Gall, Winterthur, and Zurich.
19sample that excludes the 11 largest cities compared to the baseline estimates
of Table 3 for single-family homes. However, it is important to stress that
the pattern between common and non common immigrant 
ows remains the
same. Only non common language in
ows matter. 2(6) tests reject the null
that the immigration eect from the sample without large cities is the same
as the baseline estimates from Table 3. This result is interpreted to mean
that the baseline estimates are driven by large city dynamics. An explanation
for this large city eect is simply that immigrants are more likely to reside
in larger districts because these regions oer better job opportunities and
amenities. Indeed, over 40% of the total immigrants live in the 11 districts
with populations larger than 150,000.
An additional check examines whether local tightness in the housing mar-
ket in
uences the baseline estimate. Columns 7, 8, and 9 show regressions of
the baseline specication with local vacancy rates, vit 1. This variable is
insignicant and has no in
uence on the baseline estimates of Table 3. This
result is interpreted to mean that the housing market is tight throughout
Switzerland and therefore does not explain local dierences in house prices.
Table 5 presents regression results for immigrant 
ows from individual
countries on single-family homes. The regressions are divided between com-
20mon language countries with a positive immigrant 
ow into Switzerland from
2000 to 2006 (i.e., France +10,451, Germany +61,791, and Austria +3,241)
and non common language immigrants (i.e., Netherlands +1,763, Portugal
+33,256, and the United Kingdom +5,129).20 The regression specications
follow those presented in Table 3. The ordering of the country results for
each language group is based on the immigrant stock in 2006.21
The results in Table 5 show that coecients for immigrant 
ows from
non common language countries are positive and signicant and coecients
for immigrant 
ows from common language countries are close to zero and
insignicant except for France. Because the immigrant 
ows from the indi-
vidual countries is highly unequal, so are the coecient values. Germany
and Portugal, the largest immigrant groups, oer the most reasonable esti-
mates. A Portuguese immigrant in
ow equal to 1% of an area's population
is coincident with an increase in prices for single-family homes of about 9%,
whereas for German immigrants no price impact is identied. The fact that
20The other European immigrant countries that observed out
ows are Italy -29,955,
Serbia -63, Spain -15,554, and Turkey -5,757.
21The end of sample numbers are for non common language immigrants: Portugal
173,477, United Kingdom 26,005, Netherlands 16,143 and common language immigrants:
Germany 172,580, France 71,534, and Austria 32,889.
21a strong price impact is also found for British and Dutch immigrants sug-
gests that labor skill is not important for the house price result. The larger
coecients for British (31.6) and Dutch (190.5) is explained by their small
in
ows. Thus, their estimates need to be treated with caution. Similarly,
the highly signicant results for French immigrant 
ows is explained by their
high concentration in Swiss cities. More than half of the French immigrants
live in the ve largest cities.22
6. Conclusions
The conjecture that non-common language immigrants are more price in-
sensitive than common language immigrants is supported by evidence from
the Swiss housing market. The results show that immigrant in
ow from a
non common language country equal to 1% of an area's population is co-
incident with an increase in prices for single-family homes of about 4.9%,
22The French are a clear outlier, 56% of the immigrants live in the ve largest cities.
Li (2008) using diversity indexes nds a strong clustering result of French immigrants for
Canadian cities. The same percentages for the ve largest cities for the other common
language countries are lower: Germany 27% and Austria 28%. Instead, the percentages
for the non common language countries are higher: Portugal 40%, United Kingdom 45%,
and Netherlands 34%.
22whereas immigrant in
ow from a common language country has no statisti-
cally signicant impact. These empirical dierences support the view that
the language skill mix can lead to dierences as to how immigrants value
local amenities and their ability to integrate in their newly adopted country.
23References
Aydemir, A., Borjas, G., 2011. Attenuation bias in measuring the wage
impact of immigration, Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
Akbari, A., Aydede, Y., 2009. Eects of immigration on housing prices in
Canada, Atlantic Metropolis Centre, Working Paper No. 24-2009.
Card, D., 2001. Immigrant in
ows, native out
ows, and the local labor
market impacts of higher immigration, Journal of Labor Economics 19(1),
22-64.
Chiswick, B. R., Miller, P. W., 1995. The endogeneity between earnings:
international analysis, Journal of Labor Economics 13(2), 246-288.
Degen, K., Fischer, A. M., 2009. Immigration and Swiss house prices, CEPR
Discussion Paper 7583.
Edin, P. A., Fredriksson, P., Aslund, O., 2003. Ethnic enclaves and the
economic success of immigrants: evidence from a natural experiment,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 329-357.
Frattini, T., 2008. Immigration and prices in the UK, UCL Working Paper.
Gonzalez, L., Ortega, F., 2009. Immigration and housing booms: evidence
from Spain, IZA DP No. 4333.
Greulich, E., Quigley, J. M., Raphael, S., 2004. The anatomy of rent burdens:
immigration, growth and rental housing, Brookings Papers on Urban Af-
fairs, 149-187.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2009. Cultural biases in economic
exchange, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(3), 1095-1131.
Li, Q., 2008. Language, immigration, and cities, Ph.D. Thesis, University of
British Columbia.
M unz, R., 2008. Migration, labor markets, and integration of migrants: an
overview for Europe, SP Discussion Paper No. 0807.
Munshi, K., 2003. Networks in the modern economy: mexican migrants in
the U.S. labor market, Quarterly Journal of Economics 188(2), 549-599.
24Ottaviano, G. I. P., Peri, G., 2007. The eects of immigration on U.S. wages
and rents: a general equilibrium approach, working paper.
Rivera-Batiz, F. L., 1990. English language prociency and the economic
progress of immigrants, Economic Letters 34, 295-300.
Saiz, A., 2007. Immigration and housing rents in American cities, Journal of
Urban Economics 61(2), 345-371.
Stalder, P., 2003. Entkoppelung der Mieten vom Hypozins: Implikationen
der Mietrechtsrevision f ur die Geldpolitik, SNB Quartalsheft (3), 44-57.
Werczberger, E., 1997. Home ownership and rent control in Switzerland,
Housing Studies 12(3), 337-353.
W uest and Partner, 2004a. Immo-Monitoring 2004/1 Analysen und Prog-
nosen Fokus Wohnungsmarkt, Verlag W&P, Zurich.
W uest and Partner, 2004b. Immo-Monitoring 2004/3 Analysen und Prog-
nosen Fokus Gesch afts
























































































W&P Single-Family House Price Index
Source: Wüest and Partner, Zurich

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2:Average Annual Real Increase in Single Family House Prices 1970-2006  
Germany -0.38
Switzerland 0.34
Japan 0.36
Sweden 1.00
Finland 1.59
Norway 2.19
Italy 2.23
USA 2.29
Denmark 2.42
Canada 2.53
France 2.55
Australia 2.97
New Zealand 3.19
Netherlands 3.26
Belgium 3.58
Ireland 3.90
Spain 3.95
United Kingdom 4.14
source:finfacts.ie
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i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
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a
F
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
f
(
S
P
i
t
)
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b
F
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
f
(
S
P
i
t
)
h
i
g
h
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a
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e
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A
:
 
2
n
d
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
L
n
-
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
H
o
u
s
e
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
(


p
i
t
)
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
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1
s
t
 
S
t
a
g
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
-
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
/
y
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
I
m
m
i
g
r
a
n
t
s
 
t
o
 
N
a
t
i
v
e
s
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
(

I
i
t
 
/
 
P
o
p
i
t
-
1
)
N
o
t
e
s
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
o
f
T
a
b
l
e
5
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
s
t
h
e
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
f
i
m
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
(
A
L
L
,
N
C
L
(
n
o
n
c
o
m
m
o
n
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
)
,
C
L
(
c
o
m
m
o
n
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
)
a
n
d
t
h
e
S
w
i
s
s
h
o
u
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
i
n
d
e
x
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
l
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
o
f
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
i
n
d
e
x
,

p
i
t
,
f
o
r
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
f
a
m
i
l
y
h
o
m
e
s
.

I
i
t
/
P
o
p
i
t
-
1
i
s
t
h
e
y
/
y
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
i
m
m
i
g
r
a
n
t
s
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
r
e
g
i
o
n
i
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t
t
i
m
e
t
-
1
.

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i
t
-
1
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
t
h
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
g
i
o
n
i
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
t
-
1
,
I
n
P
a
n
e
l
B
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
-
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
e
d
.
T
h
e
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
i
m
m
i
g
r
a
n
t
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
,
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
s
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t
p
a
t
t
e
r
n
s
o
f
i
m
m
i
g
r
a
n
t
s
i
n
1
9
9
7
,
S
P
i
t
,
.
A
l
l
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
f
i
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
b
y
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
f
o
r
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
H
e
t
e
r
o
s
k
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
-
r
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
;
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
a
F
i
r
s
t
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
f
(
S
P
i
t
)
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